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Abstract 
This work project intends to evaluate the effectiveness of the Portuguese Government’s 
strategy to promote the orderly deleveraging of the corporate sector in the context of the 
current economic crisis. The recommendations of the Troika and the commitments assumed 
under the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government in 2011 required the 
creation of formal processes to avoid disorderly deleveraging. Conclusions and 
recommendations were drawn based on past experiences of large-scale corporate 
restructuring strategies in other countries and on the analysis of financial and statistical data 
on companies applying for “Programa Especial de Revitalização”. 
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1. Introduction 
This project aims at evaluating the effectiveness of the Portuguese Government approach to 
corporate restructuring in the context of the Euro area peripheral countries economic crisis, 
focusing on one of the key instruments of the restructuring program “Revitalizar” launched 
by the Government in 2012, “Processo Especial de Revitalização” (Special Revitalization 
Process or “PER”). PER is an instrument created by the Portuguese Government to promote, 
speed up and facilitate orderly restructuring of distressed corporations, avoiding court 
overloading and long lasting lawsuits that ultimately lead to corporate bankruptcy. This 
process has been widely discussed in the last few months and frailties have been pointed out 
in the latest reviews of the Portuguese economy made by the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank (together the “Troika”). As a 
consequence, the Portuguese Government has been re-evaluating its framework following 
the recommendations made by these three institutions. 
The purpose of this work is to evaluate the degree to which PER has reached its objectives 
of providing an alternative solution to insolvency for viable companies by promoting creditor 
coordination and risk sharing. For this purpose, statistical evidence regarding the evolution 
of the number of insolvencies before and after the implementation of PER has been analysed. 
Furthermore, a research was conducted in a selected sample of companies that have applied 
for PER, evaluating their financial situation before the process, in order to determine whether 
these were in fact viable companies through their operational and financial performance. The 
results of this analysis will show that the PER has not been able to fulfil the objectives 
initially set out. As conclusion, this work will try to determine the main reasons for this and 
present a few possible recommendations on how to improve the efficacy of the program.  
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2. Corporate debt restructuring in financial crisis: a review of the literature 
The latest economic crisis and tighter credit conditions have raised corporate debt problems 
across the world. If not dealt with in due time, these problems can have severe 
macroeconomic consequences and threaten the banking system, which is not able to provide 
additional credit. This situation creates a vicious cycle as corporates are unable to deleverage 
because of the recession and banks are unable to boost economic recovery due to undermined 
balance sheets. The intervention of central banks, despite minimizing the impact on the real 
economy, does not assess the true causes of the problem (Spaventa, 2008).  
Solving corporate debt problem has therefore become an important part of recovery strategies 
in several countries. However, an abrupt and disorganized adjustment to corporate and banks’ 
balance sheets can have severe consequences in the real economy, leading to spill overs to 
sovereign balance sheets and consequent high macroeconomic and financial costs, especially 
in countries with limited fiscal space, exchange rate restrictions and high dependence on 
external factors, such as Portugal. In order to avoid high deleveraging costs, the corporate 
restructuring process must aim at restoring corporate productivity and growth and a 
sustainable economic recovery (Goretti and Souto, 2013). 
The purpose of corporate restructuring is therefore a timely and orderly restructuring of 
corporate liabilities in order to restore operational and financial health in distressed but still 
viable firms while liquidating non-viable ones (Grigoriani and Raei, 2010). In order to be 
successful and sustainable, strategies should include some form of operational restructuring 
addressing the structure and efficiency of the firm’s business through closures and 
reorganization of production capacity (Laryea, 2010). 
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In the context of a deep economic crisis, where corporate debt problems are widespread and 
carry potentially sizable macroeconomic consequences, market failures can inhibit voluntary 
debt workouts. Rather than addressing unsustainable debt issues, firms and creditors often 
delay restructuring in the hope that economic recovery might bail them out, resulting in the 
proliferation of non-viable firms and further damaging credit conditions. In this context, 
government intervention may be necessary through legal, regulatory and financial reforms to 
support corporate restructuring as part of an economic adjustment process (Laryea, 2010). 
Government intervention can take the form of i) a centralized approach, through direct 
financial assistance and/or the creation of specialized asset management public agencies 
(“AMC”) responsible for acquiring and disposing of distressed assets; or ii) a decentralized, 
creditor-led work-out approach, which relies on banks and other creditors’ initiative to solve 
NPL, where the government takes the role of a mediator, providing the appropriate legal 
foundations and incentives for out-of-court resolutions (Dado and Klingebiel, 2002).  
Government involvement through direct financial assistance usually takes place when debt 
problems are pervasive and have negative externalities on the economy (Grigoriani and Raei, 
2010). The adoption of this approach is limited to the degree of available fiscal space and 
impact on public debt sustainability. It can also cause inefficiencies and moral hazard issues, 
by shielding creditors and debtors from losses, preserving non-viable firms and excess 
capacity and encouraging risky behaviour going forward (Hagan, 2010).  
The decentralized creditor-led work-out approach relies on banks and other creditors to 
resolve non-performing loans, based on the principle that banks have the highest incentives 
to maximize recovery value and avoid future losses. They are also able to provide additional 
funding when necessary and maintain payment discipline, often lost when credits are 
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transferred to external agencies. On the other hand, ownership links and corporate 
governance issues between banks and corporations are not dealt with and may become an 
impediment to corporate restructuring (Dado and Klingebiel, 2002).  
The involvement of the government as mediator is necessary when court and administrative 
systems are weak and market failures or legal impediments inhibit banks of leading debt 
restructuring. In these cases, the government can play a constructive role in facilitating the 
orderly workout of debts, following the so-called London Approach, named after the 
measures taken by the Bank of England during the UK recession of the 1970’s, which 
encouraged creditors and debtors to adopt a coordinated approach to minimize losses to 
creditors, avoid the bankruptcy of viable debtors and maintain financial support to viable 
debtors through out-of-court restructuring agreements (Grigoriani and Raei, 2010). 
The strategy for dealing with corporate debt restructuring should be tailored to individual 
country circumstances and the dimension of the debt problem. Under this principle, 
intermediate approaches to corporate restructuring have been applied in many countries, 
which combine case by case analysis, government fiscal incentives and legal and regulatory 
reforms with the establishment of public agencies to galvanize debt restructuring (Laryea, 
2010). Country data analysis also shows that often different strategies were applied 
depending on the size of distressed companies – large firms’ debts are either worked-out 
voluntarily among creditors under government sponsored programs or liquidated and 
restructured under court supervision and smaller companies’ debts are worked out on an out-
of-court basis or under standard bankruptcy procedures (Claessens, 2004).  
In general, when tailoring a corporate debt restructuring strategy to individual country 
circumstances a number of key factors should be taken into account, namely:  
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a) Policy coordination: government intervention should consider the dimension and origin of 
corporate debt problems and the effects that policies may have on the success of the 
strategy in order to avoid common pitfalls and risks (Laryea, 2010). 
b) Analysis of data to assess the relative dimension of the debt problem and the implications 
for creditors, especially bank balance sheets (Hagan, 2010).  
c) Legal and institutional reform: effective insolvency systems facilitate the rehabilitation of 
corporations, provide an efficient mechanism for liquidation of unviable firms and help 
overcome coordination issues. In the context of a crisis, the effectiveness of an insolvency 
law can be compromised by market failures and the number of outstanding cases to be 
processed (Hagan, 2010). It is crucial that the insolvency law establishes incentives for 
out-of-court restructuring and provides courts with mechanisms to enforce restructuring 
agreements accepted by the majority of creditors on dissident ones (Laryea, 2010).  
d) Government support to facilitate out-of-court restructuring: international experience from 
past crisis indicates that some degree of government involvement in supporting guidelines 
for out-of-court restructuring facilitates wide scale debt restructurings (Laryea, 2010). 
e) Facilitation of voluntary standstills: Standstills are necessary to relieve firms from liquidity 
pressures and can be enough to sustain distressed companies through crisis averting them 
to fail due to the freezing of credit markets. However, in cases where a substantial 
proportion of the corporate sector is in distress, negotiating case by case standstill periods 
may not be feasible. Therefore, government incentives to creditor participation in 
standstills can be considered, namely through financial assistance (Laryea, 2010). 
f) Government involvement in new financing: reforming the insolvency law to give priority 
to new debt over existing facilities can be an incentive to new funding. Even though in a 
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credit crisis the cost of new money can be unbearable to firms, governments’ direct 
involvement in providing direct credit to firms should be avoided (Laryea, 2010). 
g) Differing intervention for SME’s: small and medium sized enterprises are usually the bulk 
of the corporate sector and therefore a differentiated approach should be defined for these 
companies as the banking and court systems do not have the capacity to efficiently 
restructure distressed SME on a case by case basis and their mass failure could have severe 
social consequences which further deteriorate macroeconomic conditions (Laryea, 2010). 
h) Coordination with financial sector restructuring: the rehabilitation of the baking sector is 
a key priority for crisis containment and resolution. In principle, banks prefer market-based 
approaches to debt restructuring to avoid costly and slow court-based bankruptcy 
procedures. However, in the context of a systemic crisis, coordination failures and 
externalities may inhibit progress. In these cases, government intervention may be needed 
to secure the availability of resources and the right set of institutional arrangements for 
negotiating parties (Grigoriani and Raei, 2010).  
i) Governance issues: ownership links between banks and borrowers can hamper the 
effectiveness of decentralized work-out strategies as the same party can be both debtor and 
creditor (Dado and Klingebiel, 2002).  
Finally, the timeframe for implementing a corporate debt restructuring strategy is equally 
important as a concerted implementation cannot be sustained during the height of a crisis. In 
a containment phase, priority should be given to recapitalizing the financial sector, 
introducing legal and regulatory reforms and facilitating voluntary standstills on payments, 
setting the bases for wide scale corporate debt restructuring. Also, it should be clear that the 
liquidation of non-viable firms cannot and should not be avoided (Laryea, 2010). 
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The literature on corporate debt restructuring emphasizes the need for clear public policies 
to provide the right institutional framework and incentives for an orderly deleverage. The 
experience from former financial crisis points out the importance of private debt restructuring 
mechanisms in containing the delving effects of financial crisis on corporate structure and 
employment. The next sections will evaluate the Portuguese Government’s strategy to 
promote and facilitate corporate debt restructuring. Even though the instruments created 
respond to several issues herein raised, this work project will try to demonstrate whether this 
program has been effective so far and what still needs to be done to improve its results.  
2. Corporate restructuring in Portugal 
1.1. Background and legal framework 
In 2011, Portugal corporate debt leverage reached an average of 150% of equity and 60% of 
total corporate assets, a level among the highest in the Euro area. At the same time, firms’ 
capacity to repay debt, proxied by the Interest Coverage Ratio (“ICR”), stood at less than 2, 
among the lowest in the Euro area. Since the onset of the global crisis in 2008, Portuguese 
firms made sizable adjustments to their operational balances, namely through the reduction 
in wage costs and by diversifying their activity abroad. However, the ability to boost foreign 
sales has been limited by the weak external demand from the Euro area and the need to 
achieve productivity and competitiveness gains through a more gradual internal devaluation 
process. As a result, there was a significant decline in firms’ investment in fixed assets, 
translating into a sharp adjustment in domestic demand and record-high unemployment rate1. 
                                                 
1 International Monetary Fund “Portugal: Selected Issues Paper” 
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In past crisis episodes, restructuring processes have followed different approaches depending 
on country-specific circumstances and the severity of corporate leverage problems, ranging 
from direct government involvement to government-sponsored market-based models.  
Given its limited fiscal space, the Portuguese Government has opted for a market-based 
approach. In 2012, following the Portuguese Government’s request for financial assistance, 
a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) was signed with the IMF, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (together the “Troika”). In what concerned the 
corporate debt restructuring framework, the MoU included commitments regarding: i) the 
amendment of the insolvency law and the introduction of fast-track court approval 
procedures for restructuring plans in order to facilitate the rescue of viable firms; ii) the issue 
of general principles on voluntary out-of-court restructuring in line with international best 
practices; iii) the authorization for tax and social security administrations to use a wider range 
of restructuring tools in cases where other creditors agree to restructure claims, and review 
the tax law with a view to removing impediments to voluntary debt restructuring; and iv) the 
launch of a campaign to raise public and stakeholder awareness of the restructuring tools 
available for early rescue of viable firms through training and new information campaigns2. 
In order to comply with the provisions set forth in the MoU, in May 2012, the Portuguese 
Government created the Program “Revitalizar” aimed at promoting the orderly restructuring 
of corporates in distressed situations. Under the program, two instruments were created for 
allowing debtor recovery outside the formal insolvency procedures: 
- PER – “Processo Especial de Revitalização”, a court-supervised recovery system; 
                                                 
2 “Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality” signed between the Portuguese 
Government and Troika 
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- SIREVE – “Sistema de Recuperação de Empresas por Via Extra-judicial”, a system 
for out-of-court corporate restructuring. 
These instruments respond to the first two commitments set out in the MoU signed with the 
Troika – the PER intends to be a fast track court approval procedure for restructuring plans; 
the SIREVE responds to the need for guidelines for out-of-court debt workouts. Both 
instruments aim at establishing a voluntary negotiation system between the debtor and the 
totality or, at least, the majority of its creditors, in order to reach an agreement that allows 
the full recovery of the debtor. In principle, it should only be initiated when there is a high 
probability of the debtor overcoming its financial difficulties through an agreement and that 
it can maintain its normal activity once the agreement is concluded3. 
Processo Especial de Revitalização (herein “PER”) was created in 2012 by Law n. 16/2012 
of 20th April, in order to introduce new recovery tools for companies undergoing financial 
difficulties. The purpose of the PER is to allow viable entities in distress or in an imminent 
insolvency situation, to establish negotiations with creditors in order to reach an agreement 
for rehabilitation. A distressed financial situation is defined as serious difficulty to fulfil 
obligations in a timely manner, due to liquidity constraints and inability to obtain credit.  
The process may be used by all debtors that, by means of a written declaration signed by 
themselves and their creditors, affirm that they gather the necessary conditions for recovery. 
After sending the declaration to the judge of the competent courthouse, a judicial 
administrator is named and a communication is sent to all creditors stating the intention of 
starting the recovery process. From that point onwards, the process has a maximum period 
                                                 
3 IAPMEI and Governo de Portugal “Programa Revitalizar: Guia para processos de recuperação de empresas” 
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of 4 months to be concluded. During that period, all outstanding actions interposed against 
debtors and ongoing insolvency procedures are suspended and no additional actions may be 
initiated. Also, debtors are forbidden to take actions with relevant impact on their economic 
situation without previous written approval by the judicial administrator. If a final agreement 
is reached between the debtor and all creditors, the PER is automatically approved. If the 
agreement is signed only by a qualified majority of creditors, the court has the power to 
approve or deny the implementation of the agreement. In case an agreement is not reached 
within the defined timeframe, and the debtor was previously in an insolvency situation, 
insolvency is immediately declared and normal proceedings take place. In case the debtor 
was not in an insolvency situation it is up to the judicial administrator to decide whether it 
should be declared insolvent. In either cases, the debtor may not apply for PER for the next 
2 years following the decision. 
In terms of guarantees for creditors involved in the process, all guarantees agreed between 
debtors and their creditors during the PER in order to assure the necessary financial support 
for its recovery stay in place even if negotiations fail and insolvency is declared, for a period 
of 2 years. Additional funding provided during the rehabilitation has priority over all other 
credits, in case the recovery plan fails and the company is dissolved. 
The SIREVE was introduced in September through Decree-Law n. 178/2012 of 3rd August 
for reforming and simplifying the pre-existing extra-judicial conciliation system. This 
program aims at simplifying recovery procedures by relying on IAPMEI, the Portuguese 
agency for support of small and medium sized companies, as mediator, responsible for 
assessing whether corporate candidates are eligible for restructuring, centralizing all 
necessary information, promoting the coordination among creditors and deciding whether the 
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proposed restructuring agreement is viable. Proposals must be based on a viable and feasible 
business plan, which identifies necessary measures for re-establishing the economic 
sustainability of the company and its ability to fulfil all conditions set in the restructuring 
agreement, namely by presenting provisional financial statements for one period that show a 
balanced financial and economic situation, namely a Financial Autonomy ratio of at least 
15% to 20% and a General Liquidity Ratio of 1.054.  
1.2. Strengths and limitations 
The reform of the insolvency law with the introduction of these two instruments responds to 
some of the criteria that define a good corporate restructuring strategy and follows other 
policies implemented by the Portuguese Government, namely aiming at restructuring the 
financial sector – they provide a fair opportunity of restructuring to all firms facing financial 
distress while maintaining the threat of insolvency; prepacked agreements negotiated out-of-
court become enforceable if signed by a qualified majority of creditors; actions undergone 
by debtors and creditors which may harm the negotiations are prohibited during the 
negotiation period; proposals must be law abiding and approved by either judicial 
representatives or a government agency; and in case restructuring plans fail and insolvency 
proceedings take place, new debt granted during the negotiation period has priority over 
existing responsibilities, including debts to employees, social security and fiscal authorities. 
Furthermore, the Government has been involved in promoting new financing through the 
creation of specific guaranteed credit lines directed to be granted to SME by retail banks. In 
2014, this credit line (“PME Investimento”) had a total amount approved of €2 billion. 
                                                 
4 IAPMEI and Governo de Portugal “Programa Revitalizar: Guia para processos de recuperação de empresas” 
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However in its 11th Assessment of the Portuguese Economy, Troika identified points that 
need to be addressed in order to improve the efficacy of “Revitalizar”:  
a) Insolvent companies often use the program to delay inevitable insolvency proceedings, 
overburdening the judicial system and further delaying the implementation of necessary 
restructuring plans for viable companies; 
b) Debtors and creditors often agree on insufficient restructuring plans, which do not include 
debt reductions, operational restructuring measures, or new funding, waiting for economic 
recovery to pull them out of distressed conditions; 
c) The out-of-court system, SIREVE, on the other hand, has been a non-viable alternative 
due to the inability of the IAPMEI to respond to requests and fulfil its part as a facilitator; 
d) Informal agreements are scarce due to high creditor dispersion, lack of coordination and 
unwillingness to provide new funding;  
e) Oversight of debt restructuring is weak with insufficient and fragmented information 
preventing an accurate analysis of the effectiveness of changes in financing conditions5. 
Additionally, although this point was not identified in the IMF report, in what concerns the 
PER, the absence of an unbiased initial assessment of the financial situation of companies 
and of the feasibility of the restructuring plans being proposed encourages strategic behaviour 
from both debtors and creditors and increases the probability of initially approved 
restructuring plans being unsuccessful and ending up with the insolvency of the debtor.  
Given the above described limitations, the main purpose of the program, which is to 
rehabilitate viable companies and dissolve unviable ones, is not being attained – viable 
                                                 
5 International Monetary Fund “Portugal: Eleventh review under the extended arrangement, and request for extension 
of the arrangement and waivers of applicability of end-March performance criteria”  
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companies face insufficient restructuring conditions and remain in a fragile financial 
situation and insolvent companies drag their situation even further, increasing creditor losses. 
3. Data analysis 
1.1. Methodology 
To analyse the efficacy of “Revitalizar” this work project will focus on PER, since there is 
no publicly available information for SIREVE. The Ministry of Justice’s portal Citius, in 
which all procedures related with insolvency and PER are registered, was used to list the 
companies that filed for PER between May 2012 and December 2013. Afterwards, a database 
was created containing financial information on each company for the past 9 years, namely 
key performance indicators such as turnover, EBITDA, financial debt, equity and interest 
expenses and a few key ratios were computed in order to have a general overview of their 
operational and financial performance before the implementation of restructuring programs.  
The purpose of this analysis was to have an idea of whether the majority of companies 
applying for a PER were sound companies facing financial difficulties under the crisis or 
whether there was a significant proportion of those companies facing financial difficulties 
and unsustainable leverage levels, hardly be overcome through financial restructuring.  
The selected sample consisted of 825 firms that filed for PER and for which financial data 
was available in the Sabi database. It should be mentioned that not all data was available in 
all the years considered in the analysis. Therefore, conclusions are made in relative terms 
considering the number of companies for which there was available information in each year. 
Additionally, statistical data regarding the evolution of insolvencies and PER was analysed 
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in order to determine whether the PER has contributed to decrease the number of 
bankruptcies in the corporate sector and to improve credit recovery ratios.  
A relevant complimentary analysis would be to evaluate the performance of the firms for 
which a restructuring agreement was reached in order to see if there were significant 
operational and financial performance improvements in the years that followed the PER and 
also to observe whether debt restructuring included haircuts or new money, a standstill period 
or an interest reduction. However, given the recent history of the legislation and the scarcity 
of financial data for the majority of companies in 2013, this analysis was not performed as 
its conclusions would not be broad or accurate enough. 
1.2. Data Analysis 
The sample of 825 firms that applied for a PER between May 2012 and December 2013 is 
characterized by a majority of Micro or SME’s, together representing 95% of the total 
number of companies analysed (of which 65% are Micro companies and 30% SME)6.  
Chart 1 – Distribution of sample by size 
 
Around of these companies operate in construction or construction related activities, with a 
significant proportion of textile, real estate and pharmaceutical companies also filing for 
                                                 
6 Micro firms employ up to 10 workers or which generate a total turnover below or equal to €2 million. SME's employ 
between 10 and 250 workers or have a total turnover between €2 million and €50 million.  
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rehabilitation process. These were the most affected sectors during the crisis and therefore 
their representativeness in the sample matches initial expectations. 
Chart 2 – Distribution of sample by business sector 
 
From the 825 companies herein observed that initiated rehabilitation programs between May 
2012 and December 2013, only 476 remain active (58%), with the percentage of liquidated 
or dissolved companies varying little across business sectors. This may indicate that either 
they were not viable companies or that the recovery process was not effective, possibly due 
to lack of coordination among debtors and creditors. It is important to mention that many of 
the processes filed had lists of creditors that included more than 20 different entities, which 
supports the idea that a consensus under these conditions is difficult to be achieved. 
Chart 3 – Current status of analysed companies 
 
Looking at financial data available for the selected companies for the last 9 years, it is 
possible to observe a severe decrease in operational performance since 2010, consequence of 
the economic recession and restricted access to funding. However, despite the decrease in 
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performance observed since 2011, operational margins were not exceptionally high in the 
previous years, with only 30% to 35% of companies registering margins above 10%. 
Chart 4 – Evolution of EBITDA Margin 
 
Considering the leverage of these companies, it is possible to conclude that the average level 
of indebtedness was above sustainable levels and had been so for several years, especially 
considering the fact that most of them are Micro companies and SME’s.  
Chart 5 – Evolution of the level of indebtedness 
 
Excluding negative ratios caused by negative EBITDA levels and eliminating extreme values 
that distort the analysis and bias conclusions, an average level of the Debt to EBITDA ratio 
was computed for each year. Despite the fact that optimal levels of debt may differ 
considerably across business sectors and company size, the average values obtained are well 
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above the levels that could be considered acceptable for any industry, indicating that at least 
a significant number of companies was facing a risky financial situation before the recession. 
Chart 6 – Evolution of Debt to EBITDA ratio 
 
This statement is confirmed when ICR are computed. Between 2005 and 2011, a third of the 
companies under analysis were unable to pay interest, indicating that a high number of 
companies had an unsustainable level of indebtedness before the credit crisis hit its peak. 
 Chart 7 – Evolution of Interest Coverage Ratio (“ICR”) 
 
Looking specifically at the real estate sector, which is one of the most vulnerable sectors to 
changes in economic environment, on average, between 2005 and 2011, more than 32 of the 
63 real estate companies that filed for recovery plans in 2012 and 2013 had an ICR below 1. 
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With the aggravation of the real estate market conditions, which led to general devaluation 
of assets, and the higher restrictions in additional loans, by the time they filed for a recovery 
plan, most of these companies were likely struggling to remain active, with limited prospects 
of improvement, placing them among the category of unviable firms. In fact, in the end of 
2013, of the 63 companies, 23 had been liquidated or started insolvency proceedings.  
This analysis supports the idea that, contrarily to the purpose of the restructuring strategy 
initially designed, which was to rehabilitate viable companies and facilitate the liquidation 
of non-viable ones, the PER has been used by firms that even before the recession had been 
facing distressed situations and unsustainable financing structures.  
1.3. Statistical evidence 
In the last three years the number of processes for insolvency and company recovery has 
increased by an average of 30% a year. The numbers for the first half of 2014 indicate a slight 
improvement relatively to the same period of 2013, but the levels should not differ 
substantially from 2012 and 2013. From the total number of processes concluded, around 
80% ended with debtor insolvency. This number has not changed substantially since 2010 
and even shows a slight increase since 2012, the year when “Revitalizar” was created. Also, 
credit recovered compared with the total amount of credit claimed remains low since 2011, 
despite the instruments introduced to facilitate restructuring7. 
Finally, despite the increase in the number of PER requests entering the system, the success 
rate has not changed since the introduction of this mechanism, remaining slightly below 50%. 
 
                                                 
7 Direcção-Geral da Política de Justiça “Estatísticas trimestrais sobre processos de falência, insolvência e recuperação 
de empresas e sobre processos especiais de revitalização”  
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Chart 8 – Evolution of insolvency and recovery processes in courts 
  
This statistical data supports the initial assessment made by Troika that the instruments 
created by the Government to promote orderly deleveraging of the corporate sector, so far, 
have not been able to fulfil their purpose. The number of insolvencies increased sharply 
between 2011 and 2012 and remained relatively constant ever since. Also, the amount of 
credit recovered in a liquidation scenario is usually much lower than the amount of credit 
that can be recovered if a recovery plan is put in place, for reasons that have to do with the 
long term sustainability of recovered firms and their ability to repay debt to their creditors. 
This can be an indicator of the low level of success in the negotiation of recovery plans, 
reinforced by the fact that less than half the PER initiated are concluded with an agreement. 
Chart 9 – Average success rate of PER 
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The low level of success in negotiations is related with the fact that many of the companies 
filing for PER do not gather the requirements for a feasible and sustainable recovery plan, 
and with the large dispersion of credits and consequent difficulties in coordination.   
4. Conclusion 
The excessive leverage of the Portuguese corporate sector in the context of an economic 
recession and credit crisis has led to a sharp increase in the number of bankruptcies, raising 
social, economic and financial costs. In order to avoid an abrupt adjustment which would 
further damage economic conditions, it was important that the Government set up the 
conditions for promoting an orderly deleveraging of the corporate sector, creating the right 
incentives for the operational and financial restructuring of viable companies while 
maintaining the mechanisms for the timely liquidation of insolvent ones. 
The strategic program “Revitalizar” created in 2012 responds to some of the conditions 
considered necessary for a successful corporate restructuring program by introducing a fast 
track court approval process for restructuring plans and incentivizing out-of-court 
restructuring in order to release the burden from the legal system. However, its full purpose 
has not been achieved, as shown by the low level of success in negotiations and the large 
percentage of companies that, after requesting for a restructuring plan, end up filing for 
insolvency. The analysis carried out during this work project indicates that this is mainly due 
to i) lack of coordination between creditors given the large dispersion of credits; ii) poor 
assessment of initial economic and financial conditions of companies applying for 
restructuring plans; and iii) resistance to implement operational restructuring measures from 
companies and to provide additional funding from banks.  
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These issues still need to be addressed in order for the program to achieve the desired result, 
which is to provide viable companies with an alternative to insolvency while maintaining fast 
liquidation mechanisms for companies that cannot be recovered. This would remove the 
excessive burden on the judicial system and avoid further economic and social costs, 
contributing for the soundness of the financial sector and the recovery from the recession. 
Besides these, other limitations regarding the efficacy of restructuring measures could be 
identified, if enough data were available for the periods following the implementation of 
restructuring plans. The initial purpose of this work project included an analysis of such 
measures, namely, whether debt restructuring plans included standstill periods, haircuts and 
debt relieves, debt/equity swaps, interest rate reductions and maturity extensions. However, 
data on this subject is scarce and highly fragmented, given its recent nature and the absence 
of more recent financial reporting information for smaller companies undergoing 
restructuring, making it impossible to take relevant and accurate conclusions on this matter. 
It is also important to note that “Revitalizar” did not target the largest Portuguese companies 
in distress, since, on the back of higher capital and lower leverage requirements that arose 
from the 2008 crisis, the Portuguese financial system implemented balance sheet 
optimization measures in an environment where private capital sources were not available.  
5. Recommendations 
On its 11th review of Portugal the IMF staff defends that the development of efficient out-of-
court workouts with standardized conditions for debt restructuring for large numbers of 
distressed but viable SME’s would be advisable to provide meaningful relief to firms, while 
encouraging bank-led and time-bound negotiations, supported by stronger mechanisms to 
foster creditor coordination (e.g. inter-creditor agreements), for larger companies. The report 
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adds that to enhance its effectiveness, the restructuring program should i) be subject to 
oversight by, and enhanced reporting to a reputable and well-qualified entity; ii) incorporate 
time-bound arbitration procedures to settle disputes among creditors or between creditors and 
debtors; and iii) include financing support for viable companies undergoing restructuring as 
an incentive for firms to enter into restructuring before their viability is in jeopardy8.  
Most of the companies that applied for restructuring under “Revitalizar” have been Micro 
companies and SME. Given their individual importance, banks may be less willing to initiate 
restructuring procedures. Defining standardized restructuring conditions for SME’s would 
decrease the level of uncertainty in the beginning of negotiations and facilitate coordination.  
Although not mentioned in the IMF report, ranking companies according with their 
importance in the economy, level of distress and probability of recovery could also be 
considered, focusing attention and resources on companies that operate in strategic sectors, 
employ a large number of workers, and can more easily overcome financial difficulties. 
Furthermore, banks should be prepared to deal with debt restructuring in an efficient manner. 
Even though some banks already have special units dedicated to restructuring credits, most 
of them still lack the necessary internal coordination for dealing with these procedures, which 
further damages their capacity to reach consensus with debtors and other creditors.  
For example, after the 1997 crisis, Korea implemented a corporate restructuring model that 
included an out-of-court procedure, in which all steps were perfectly identified, from the 
initial assessment of the company’s viability to different restructuring alternatives that could 
be considered. It also included the signature of a restructuring agreement between banks and 
                                                 
8 International Monetary Fund “Portugal eleventh review under the extended arrangement, and request for extension of 
the arrangement and waivers of applicability of end-March performance criteria”  
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the main companies under distress. In what concerned SME’s, each bank was to create a 
specialized task force responsible for classifying companies in three categories – priority 
support, conditional support and other. For the first two categories, banks were to roll over 
loans maturing within one year, while the central bank adjusted credit ceilings to encourage 
further support to small firms. Government support was provided in the form of guarantees 
and restructuring funds, to be progressively reduced in following years (Sohn, 2002).  
Increasing supervision and reinforcing provisioning policies are also ways to increase banks’ 
incentives to restructure existing loans for smaller size companies. In many countries that 
experienced large-scale corporate deleveraging (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Mexico and Turkey) coordinating bodies were created to supervise the implementation of 
restructuring strategies and provide forum for negotiations and arbitration (Claessens, 2004).  
In order to separate viable from insolvent firms and enhance the success rate of restructuring 
plans, it is important to name an independent and professional entity responsible for 
evaluating the viability of the companies and the feasibility of restructuring plans. In Spain, 
for example, the approval of out-of-court agreements is subject to presenting a business plan 
duly certified by a specialized independent entity (Grigoriani and Raei, 2010). Even though 
the SIREVE includes the same condition, according with the IMF, the IAPMEI faces severe 
constraints in evaluating business plans and has not been able to facilitate the utilization of 
this instrument. Also, the feasibility of the PER is judged by court administrative bodies 
which lack the knowledge and experience to assess the viability of companies and the 
sustainability of restructuring plans. Therefore, a list of independent entities with experience 
in financial analysis and business plan evaluation duly certified by the Government could be 
selected, for debtors and creditors to choose from.  
 
Page 26 of 27 
In order to prevent similar situations from occurring again in the future, the existence of 
proper monitoring procedures and tools in financial institutions is essential as well as proper 
supervision. Additionally, financial support should be provided for viable companies willing 
to implement restructuring measures before reaching a distressed situation. This would 
promote operational restructuring and decrease insolvency risk.  
In Korea, after the measures implemented immediately following the 1997 crisis, a second 
phase was implemented, which promoted corporate restructuring on a regular basis. The 
Corporate Restructuring Promotion Law defined that debtor companies holding credits from 
financial institutions above KRW 50 million (approximately €37.5 million) were to be 
monitored and restructured in a timely and efficient manner. Banks were to perform periodic 
analysis of these companies and their business plans, separating viable firms facing 
temporary liquidity problems, for which additional support would be provided, from non-
viable firms, to be liquidated. This process would be constantly supervised by the Financial 
Supervisory Commission. Additionally, cooperation mechanisms were created between 
financial institutions, including a creditor committee responsible for identifying troubled 
companies, evaluate co-management strategies, indicate loan expiration dates, adjust loans 
or newly granting of credit, and discuss management normalization procedures. Financial 
institutions which did not agree with decisions of this committee would have an option to 
acquire credits and manage them on their own (Sohn, 2002). 
Finally, changes in the capital structure of companies should be stimulated, by reinforcing 
equity and reducing the dependence on bank loans. Restructuring tools such as debt/equity 
swaps and measures such as asset sale for debt repayment should be promoted, namely 
through tax incentives, as done in both Korea and Russia (Grigoriani and Raei, 2010).  
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